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Introduction:  Desert Research and Technology 
Studies (Desert RATS) is a multi-year series of 
hardware and operations tests carried out annually in 
the high desert of Arizona on the San Francisco 
Volcanic Field.  Conducted since 1997, these 
activities are designed to exercise planetary surface 
hardware and operations in conditions where long-
distance, multi-day roving is achievable.  Such 
activities not only test vehicle subsystems through 
extended rough-terrain driving, they also stress 
communications and operations systems and allow 
testing of science operations approaches to advance 
human and robotic surface capabilities.  
 
Desert RATS 2010 tested two crewed rovers 
designed as first generation prototypes of small 
pressurized vehicles.  Each rover provided the 
internal volume necessary for crewmembers to live 
and work for periods up to 14 days, as well as 
allowing for extravehicular activities (EVAs) through 
the use of rear-mounted suit ports.  The 2010 test was 
designed to simulate geologic science traverses over 
a 14-day period through a terrain of cinder cones, 
lava flows and underlying sedimentary units. 
Conduct of the actual test took place between 31 
August and 13 September 2010.  Two crewmembers 
lived in and drove each rover for a single week with a 
“shift change” on day 7, resulting in a total of eight 
test subjects for the two week period.  Each crew 
consisted of an engineer/commander and an 
experienced field geologist.  Three of the 
engineer/commanders were experienced astronauts 
with at least one Space Shuttle flight.  The field 
geologists were drawn from the academic 
community.  Three of the crews were male, with the 
fourth crew being female. 
 
Operations were tested with different 
communication states and rover deployment 
conditions.  Three days of each week operated under 
continuous communications with mission operations 
team, and three days the rovers were operated with 
communications only for ≈1 hour in the morning and 
≈1 hour at the end of the traverse day.  In addition, 
portions of the traverses were conducted with the two 
rovers in mutual support, largely operating as a single 
entity, while during other periods, the rovers operated 
out of line-of-site of each other, pursuing 
independent science objectives.   
 
Science Operations Management Approach: 
Past experience has shown that overseeing manned 
operations of multiple vehicles requires a separate 
control room for each (e.g., Space Shuttle and ISS 
operations prior to docking of the orbiter to ISS or 
after undocking).  Consequently, each rover worked 
directly with a Tactical Science Operations Team 
(TSOT) responsible for managing real-time science 
operations while each crew was conducting “boots on 
the ground” geologic field operations. In addition to 
the TSOT, independent test operations with two 
rovers required an integration team, termed the 
Strategic Science Operations Team (SSOT).  The 
SSOT would analyze the results of daily sciences 
operations from each rover crew after completion of 
the crew day and evaluate those operations within the 
larger objectives of the field traverse plans.   In 
particular, a major function of the SSOT was to 
evaluate the completion status of a particular day’s 
objectives and, if necessary, recommend to the 
Mission Manager variations in the following days’ 
operations in response to missed objectives or 
important, serendipitous discoveries.   
 
Major Science Operations Lessons Learned: 
Ultimately, the most critical lesson for successful 
surface operations concerns both science team 
makeup and crew background. Effective science 
operations and the best science accomplishments will 
happen when the science operations team and the 
crewmembers on the surface have a background in 
the science mission being executed, in this case, 
geology.  During this year’s operation, we had a 
highly experienced science operations team (>400 
years combined experience as scientists, >35 years 
experience in field geology) and accomplished field 
geologists in each rover.  This level of expertise was 
unprecedented, and it served to both improve the 
quality of operations in real-time as well as greatly 
inform the lessons learned.  However, we found that 
many of the problems experienced, both in the 
science support rooms and the field, could be tracked 
to the training of the science personnel in the specific 
operations they were undertaking, in procedures 
being executed and in the hardware being used.  Both 
the science operations team and the crews in the field 
improved as the 2-week test proceeded, and this 
argues that future science operations teams must be 
well trained in the activities they will be executing 
prior to mission start.   
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One of the critical issues for future planetary 
surface operations is the level of communications 
infrastructure that will be available, and whether real-
time discussions with crewmembers will be the norm.  
This year’s test had a number of significant findings 
relative to operations under continuous 
communications vs. twice daily (2-A-Day) 
communications.  The science operations teams 
found that when under working in a continuous 
communications state and with stable, high fidelity 
communications, the science return is exceptional.  In 
particular, the interaction between the crews and the 
science support rooms led to detailed discussions that 
greatly improved the TSOTs understanding of the 
geology of the field area.  In contrast, when 
communications were down or intermittent during 
continuous communications, science return was 
limited and led to a loss of critical science data, such 
as sample documentation and geologic context.  If 
communications are predicted to be poor at a given 
station, however, an aggressive tactical team and a 
scientifically competent crew can work out the 
operational details of the science to be performed 
prior to communications becoming degraded and still 
achieve substantive science return.  A related 
“corollary” is that if the crew is operating in 
challenging terrain with constrained communications 
and flight rules that require constant contact with the 
ground, EVAs may be driven to operations in 
locations that provide poor science return.  In short, 
mission planning may drive the crew to a mediocre or 
poor site because the best site results in loss of 
communications. 
 
Relative to 2-A-Day communications, the quality 
of the science return is directly related to both the 
quality of the crews’ science training and their ability 
to review acquired data prior to leaving a particular 
geologic station.  With well-trained field geologists 
and well-executed field procedures, the science return 
is still high, although the absence of interaction 
between the crew and the ground science team will 
limit the science discussions that improve science 
return on during continuous communications.  In 
addition, the crew must have the ability to review 
acquired data prior to leaving a particular site, 
particularly image data.  Otherwise, poor images will 
deprive the ground of a critical data set for both 
documentation and interpretation of science 
operations at a given locality. 
 
Tactical and Strategic Science Operations Teams 
were deployed this year at a level not previously 
tested on RATS.  In the case of the Tactical Science 
Operations Team (TSOT), it was found that a critical 
part of improved science return was the interaction 
between the scientists during EVAs.  This allowed 
hypotheses to be considered that would account for 
crew descriptions and discussion and, where it was 
possible to interact with the crew, hypotheses could 
be tested in real-time.  However, even with delayed 
communications, as will be experienced on either 
NEO or Mars missions, the internal interaction of the 
tactical science team as it watches an EVA proceed 
will still be a critical part of science data gathering, 
even when the team cannot interact with the crew.  In 
short, delayed communications will still benefit from 
real-time science analysis by a competent tactical 
team.   
 
Relative to SSOT operations, it was found that 
the quantity of data from four crewmembers and 
multiple imaging systems posed a significant obstacle 
to analysis, integration and interpretation of a given 
day’s data set within the 8-hour shift allowed.  One of 
the biggest problems was analysis and interpretation 
of verbal communications.  Transcripts were not 
available, requiring team members collecting data 
from verbal descriptions of geologic context and 
sample to listen, in real-time, to a complete verbal 
exchange.  In short, it is not possible to “speed listen” 
the way it would be possible to skim a written 
transcript and glean the pertinent data.  Largely, 
managing data by the SSOT was an issue data access 
that will be improved with good data system design 
that is based on the SSOT’s experience in RATS 
2010. 
 
The 2010 RATS Science Operations Test was 
extremely successful, testing a variety of old and new 
operations approaches to managing science data and 
crew operations on planetary surfaces.  The lessons 
learned in 2010 are already being applied to the 
planning for the RATS 2011 operation.  In addition 
to substantive lessons learned that will be discussed 
other abstracts (e.g., [1]), the test served to begin 
training a new generation of scientists in the demands 
of planetary surface science operations. 
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